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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A GUIDE FOR
CORPORATIONS
Pamela Taylor*
History of the Privilege
The legal profession has, since its inception, insisted on confidenti-
ality between lawyer and client. This "privilege" has its origins in an-
cient Rome, where in the second century, A.D., Roman law provided
that a slave could not disclose his master's secrets.1 The slave was a
member of the master's household, and loyalty and fidelity were of par-
amount importance in the society/family structure. Attorneys were ser-
vants; servants were slaves; a slave/servant was not permitted to testify
against his master.' The privilege attached automatically by virtue of
the family relationship and was very broad in scope. The master was
the holder of the privilege, and only he was entitled to waive it.
During the Elizabethan period, the attorney-client privilege gained
importance as an effective bar to disclosure of confidential information.
The first reported case involving the attorney-client privilege was Wal-
dron and Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B. 1654), wherein the privilege
was narrowly applied to give protection only to confidential matters as-
certained by an attorney directly from the client, while serving in his
official capacity. Independent observations made by the attorney were
considered nonprivileged and disclosable. The privilege continued to
develop, as English law declared the attorney to be the holder of the
privilege." Consequently, only the attorney could waive the privilege; by
so doing, the client could be compelled to testify against his own inter-
ests. The Court of Exchequer said "the privilege of an attorney is the
privilege of the client,"5 and the basis of the privilege is "on the oath
and honor of the attorney."
* Paralegal, Arkansas Power & Light Company Legal Dept., Little Rock, Ark.; Member,
National Ass'n of Legal Assistants; and Charter member, Ark. Ass'n of Legal Assistants.
1. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN, 66
(1932).
2. Id.; Cicero, pro Milone, 48.18.1.3.
3. Valiant v. Dodemead, 21 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1743).
4. Preston v. Carr, 148 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ex. 1826).
5. Id. at 635.
6. Ebsworth v. Alliance Ins. Co., 7 Q.B.D. 405 (1873).
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By the end of the eighteenth century in England, the scope of the
privilege had narrowed even more. The long-held "point of honor"
could not be justified, so it was abandoned in favor of a new trend to
foster full trust in the attorney in order to prevent inhibitions to the
discovery process, and although the purpose of the privilege was to pro-
mote confidentiality for the client's secrets, the privilege was inconsis-
tently applied. 7
The first reported American case to address the issue of attorney-
client privilege was Dixon v. Parmalee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829). The court
said: (1) the privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney; (2) the
attorney may exercise the privilege on behalf of the client; and (3) the
privilege applies only to disclosures with regard to legal advice in a
current attorney-client relationship and not to other professionals.8
In the early twentieth century, Wigmore formulated the elements
of application of the privilege: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5)
by client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from dis-
closure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived." 9
Rule 26(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938,
addresses the privilege and permits "discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in the pending
action."' 0 Such discovery may include "the existence, description, na-
7. See Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833); Bolton v. Corporation of Liver-
pool, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch. 1833).
8. Dixon v. Parmalee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829).
9. J. WIGMORE, 8 EviDENCE, § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a)
shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasons-
bly cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii)
the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the impor-
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ture, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of any discoverable matter." 1 Federal courts gave the rule broad
construction, 12 which improved the status of the privilege, since the rule
excludes privileged communications. The privilege itself, being nar-
rower in scope, began to receive attention as attorneys and courts alike
tried to define its parameters.
In modern application, the attorney-client privilege guarantees
that the client's discussions with his attorney will remain confidential.
Privilege allows the attorney to calm the client's fears that embarrass-
ing or legally damaging statements may become public knowledge.
Also, assurance of the privilege enables the attorney to extract from the
client all information pertinent to his proper representation of his cli-
ent. Conventional application of the privilege has been to the relation-
ship between an attorney and an individual. However, the rationale for
the privilege may also apply to corporations and other entities who to
seek legal advice.
Definition of Client
The Model Code of Evidence published by the American Law In-
stitute in 1942 states in Rule 209, "'client' means a person or corpora-
tion or other association that, directly or through an authorized repre-
sentative, consults a lawyer or the lawyer's representative for the
purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service from him in
his professional capacity . ,,"I The Uniform Rules of Evidence (is-
sued in 1953 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, in cooperation with the American Law Institute)
gives the same definition of "client" as in the Model Code.14 Arkansas
Statutes Annotated Section 28-1001.502 defines "client" to include
corporations. 5
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision(c).
11. Id.
12. From September 16, 1938 (date of adoption) to May, 1939, there were over 200 cases
generally construing this Rule.
13. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 209(a) (1942).
14. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(1)(1974):
"A 'client' is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization
or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a law-
yer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from
him."
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001.502 (Repl. 1979).
1984]
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By definition, a corporation is a creature of the law and has no
existence apart from the law. It "possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as inci-
dental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calcu-
lated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most
important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, indi-
viduality . ... -1 There are no cases which historically endow corpo-
rations with benefit of the attorney-client privilege. One commentator
noted: "It is generally assumed that corporations and other legal enti-
ties are entitled to the privilege just as much as individuals are. The
idea seems to go unchallenged - perhaps because in law, as in life,
many of the most deeply believed assumptions are unspoken. 1 7 The
lack of precedent on which to base the application of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to corporations was addressed in Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Association,18 a pre-trial discovery proceeding to deter-
mine whether certain corporate documents were privileged. Judge
Campbell concluded that a corporation is not entitled to assert "a privi-
lege historically created only for natural persons," 19 and said that in
order to claim the privilege,
[Tihe communication [must] be completely confidential between the
attorney and client . . . . [We] are . . . presented within the anoma-
lous situation of determining what persons within the corporate struc-
ture hold its confidence and may properly be considered as its alter
ego and therefore the "client" . . . . [S]hould we include within the
scope of the term "client" the corporation's president? What then of
other officers, members of the board of directors, executive committee
members, supervisory personnel, office workers, or for that matter any
employee, and finally what about the individual stockholders?20
The court believed the privilege had been too closely tied to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and said "both [are] limited to a purely
personal application and both [are] restricted as obviously is the one,
solely to the field of criminal law."'21 However, the court subsequently
allowed the parties to file additional briefs on the issue.
On rehearing, the district court adhered to its original determina-
16. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
17. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953
(1956).
18. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. at 773-74.
21. Id. at 775.
[Vol. 7:115
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tion.22 The court took notice of the Model Code and Uniform Rules
and concluded "that both works were intended to set forth what the
law should be and not necessarily what the law is."123 The district court
urged appeal so that the question could be placed squarely before a
court "of sufficient importance or authority to create such a privilege
by judicial ordination."24
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's holding. Judge Hastings, writing for the
court sitting en banc, cited Wigmore's conditions to the establishment
of the privilege.26 Judge Hastings noted that "no litigant has heretofore
thought there was merit enough in the proposition to warrant a chal-
lenge to the availability of the privilege to a corporation. ' 27 He cited a
number of cases in which the court had not been concerned with the
corporate or non-corporate identity of the client and reiterated that the
purpose of the privilege is to facilitate the administration of justice by
encouraging full disclosure by the client to its attorney. 8 Quoting the
definition of "client" in the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, Judge Hastings held the district court erred in his
interpretation of the Codes: "Our view is that the scholars were giving
expression to their view of the law as they found it."29
Judge Hastings urged a strict construction of the privilege, how-
ever, adopting Wigmore's admonition that "[i]t ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of
its principle. '30 He said the privilege should not allow a corporation to
"funnel" its documents through its attorney to prevent disclosure, and
that courts will attempt to prevent that by realizing "that they are not
dealing with a blanket privilege. '3 1 In short, "[a] corporation is entitled
to the same treatment as any other 'client' - no more and no less."32
22. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321 (D. Ill. 1962).
23. Id. at 323.
24. Id. at 325.
25. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 929 (1963).
26. Id. at 318.
27. Id. at 319.
28. Id. at 322.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 323, citing WIGMORE, supra note 9 at § 2291.




In-House vis-a-vis Outside Counsel
The emergence and growth of corporations in the twentieth cen-
tury has prompted the need for economic, convenient legal advice.
Most companies, especially publicly held corporations, must have day-
to-day guidance to ensure compliance with securities regulations and
other laws. If the on-staff hiring of an attorney is economically unfeasi-
ble, a small company is likely to retain an outside firm and provide it
with company letterhead and the designation "General Counsel." For
all practical purposes, the Company has "in-house counsel."
Larger corporations are often represented by both in-house attor-
neys and one or more retained outside law firms. The major distinctions
between in-house and outside counsel are that in-house counsel receive
annual salaries and are employees working exclusively for the corpora-
tion, whereas outside counsel are independent contractors who have di-
verse clients and are compensated on a per-service basis.
Because in-house counsel is more readily accessible, company em-
ployees tend to consult them on non-legal matters. Therefore, courts
have historically been more careful in applying the attorney-client priv-
ilege to communications with in-house counsel.
The Massachusetts district court, in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corporation,"3 held that a communication between client
and attorney neither inviting nor expressing any legal opinion but in-
volving mere soliciting or giving of business advice is not privileged.3'
In this civil antitrust action, Judge Wyzanski, writing for the court,
said:
[TIhe apparent factual differences between ...house counsel
and outside counsel are that the former are paid annual salaries, oc-
cupy offices in the corporation's buildings, and are employees rather
than independent contractors. These are not sufficient differences to
distinguish the two types of counsel for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege . . . .It follows that United's general counsel and his clerks
constitute for purposes of the privilege attorneys. However, no doubt a
high percentage of the communications passing to or from them fall
outside the privilege because they report or comment on information
coming from persons outside the corporation or from public docu-
ments, or are summaries of conferences held with or in the presence
of outsiders. 8'
33. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
34. Id. at 359.
35. Id. at 360.
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What, then, of attorneys whose employee responsibility is in an-
other department of the corporation? Judge Leahy addressed this issue
in a patent litigation proceeding in Delaware district court. 6
There is a privilege only if ... the person to whom the communica-
tion was made is a member of the bar of a court or his immediate
subordinate and . . . is acting as a lawyer in connection with this
communication . . . . Organizational charts to the contrary, I do not
regard patent department attorneys as "house counsel" ....
By "immediate subordinate" I mean to include in general office clerks
and help, law clerks, junior attorneys, and the like who habitually re-
port to and are under the personal supervision of the attorney through
whom the privilege passes. However, a privilege available to the attor-
ney-in-chief of a department. . . does not. . . protect everyone in his
department or everyone organizationally under him; his privilege, if
any, extends only to his immediate subordinates . . .87
Judge Leahy emphasized that when the attorney acts as an advisor, he
must give predominantly legal advice to retain the privilege, not solely,
or even largely, business advice.
A corporation's in-house counsel sometimes seeks advice of outside
counsel on behalf of the corporation. These communications may also
be privileged:
[O]nce the corporate . . . counsel is established as the "attorney,"
may he . . . turn around and label [himjself as the "client" in deal-
ings with outside attorneys[?] Again, although the question appears
incongruous, the courts have consistently answered in the affirmative.
Thus, communications between "in-house" counsel seeking legal ad-
vice for the corporate client and outside counsel giving legal advice as
an attorney are covered by the attorney-client privilege."
Work Product Doctrine
Now well established is the attorney-client privilege regarding con-
fidential communications. What, though, of an attorney's written opin-
ions, documents, notes and memoranda? This issue was addressed in
1947 when the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark
36. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
37. Id. at 794.
38. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D. S.C. 1975). See also
Natta v. Zltz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969); Dura Corp. v. Milwaukee Hydraulic Products, Inc.,
37 F.R.D. 470 (E.D. Wis. 1965); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18
F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1984]
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case of Hickman v. Taylor.9 During a tugboat accident, surviving
crewmen witnessed the death of other crewmen, and families of the
deceased crew members sued the tugboat company and its owners. The
plaintiff families sought discovery of the recorded statements taken
from surviving crewmen by defendant company's counsel. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals (reversing the district court) said the attor-
ney-client privilege applied to the statements of the tugboat company
employees, saying the information sought was the "work product of the
lawyer."4 The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Murphy spoke for the
Court: "[T]he protective cloak of [attorney-client] privilege does not
extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while
acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.""' However, Justice
Murphy broadly interpreted Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (offered by plaintiff's counsel as the basis for demands for pro-
duction of certain documents prepared by defendant's counsel). He
said:
[An] attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure
written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections pre-
pared or formed by an adverse party's counsel ...falls outside the
arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy .. . .Not even
the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquir-
ies into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney . . . .It is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy ...
without undue and needless interference . . . .Were such materials
open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.42
Plaintiffs also attempted to require defendant's counsel to commit
to writing or testify as to oral statements made to him by witnesses to
the accident. The Court took exception, saying that "forcing an attor-
ney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to de-
liver the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccu-
racy and trustworthiness [and] . .. [such testimony could not qualify
as evidence."4
The Court realized, however, that not all written materials are
free from discovery. If relevant and non-privileged information is essen-
39. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1945) (en banc).
41. 329 U.S. at 508.
42. Id. at 510-11.
43. Id. at 512-13.
[Vol. 7:115
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tial to the preparation of opposing counsel's case, discovery may be had
so long as sufficient need is shown. Rule 30(b)" gives the trial judge
discretion to allow discovery where need is shown, not simply upon "a
naked, general demand for . . . materials. '4 5
While the attorney-client privilege is intended to preserve the con-
fidences of the client, the work product doctrine is intended to protect
from disclosure the attorney's strategy, enabling him to represent his
client more effectively. Judge Wyzanski addressed the work product
line in United Shoe. While denying that working papers prepared by
attorneys in a corporation's patent department were immune from dis-
covery on the basis of the work-product doctrine, Judge Wyzanski set
out guidelines for determining the scope of the doctrine. He held a doc-
ument (or exhibit) is exempt from discovery if it meets all of the fol-
lowing three tests:
(a) the exhibit itself was prepared by or for either (1) independent
counsel or (2) defendant's general counsel or one of his immediate
subordinates; and
(b) as appears upon the face of the exhibit, the principal purpose for
which the exhibit was prepared was to solicit or give an opinion on
law or legal services or assistance in a legal proceeding; and
(c) the part of the exhibit sought to be protected consists of either (1)
information which was secured from an officer or employee of defen-
dant and which was not disclosed in a public document or before a
third person, or (2) an opinion based upon such information and not
intended for disclosure to third persons."6
Judge Leahy, in Zenith Radio Corp., elaborated on Judge Wyzanski's
opinion, stating that "work product encompasses the impressions, ob-
servations and opinions recorded by an attorney, as the product of his
investigation of a case in his actual preparation for trial . ... "' But,
the extension of the privilege does not automatically "immunize" the
work of entire departments which may be headed by an attorney and
"[r]emote possibility of litigation . . . is an insufficient showing
"48
In a more recent patent and antitrust litigation,'9 Judge Hemphill
of the South Carolina district court addressed the issue of discoverabil-
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
45. 329 U.S. at 512.
46. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Mass. 1950).
47. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
48. Id.
49. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1158.
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ity of working documents from a prior terminated litigation. "Upon a
showing of substantial need and undue hardship, both factual and opin-
ion work product documents, from prior terminated litigation became
discoverable only if the documents contained operative facts relevant to
issues involved in the present litigation .... -5 The "operative facts"
theory, if applied to current work product of pending litigation, would
negate Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,51 so no
such exception is allowed.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, in part, with
Hickman, and stated, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker:'2
Where an attorney personally prepares a memorandum of an inter-
view of a witness with an eye toward litigation such memorandum
qualifies as work product even though the lawyer functioned primarily
as an investigator. . . .[TIhe qualified privilege might even attach to
a document prepared under the supervision of the attorney even
though not drafted by the attorney himself. . .Of course, the less the
lawyer's "mental processes" are involved, the less will be the burden
to show good cause.kl-
Waiver of the application of privilege to work product was ad-
50. Id.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3):
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this
rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discover-
able under subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action
or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party
may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its sub-
ject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may
move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previ-
ously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by
the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
52. 432 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afftd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 950
(1971).
52.1. Id. at 492.
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dressed, inter alia, in Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc.5"
wherein the court stated that if a client voluntarily waives application
of the privilege to one or more documents discussing a certain subject,
he waives the privilege as to all communications between the same at-
torney and the same client on the same subject." Also, a client cannot
waive privilege as to some documents and disclaim waiver as to others;
the privilege, as to the remaining documents, is nevertheless waived.55
The court also listed some of the documents considered not privileged
in the patent litigation at bar: client authorizations to file patent appli-
cations and registrations; papers submitted to the patent office; filing
fee compendiums; resumes of applications; technical information; busi-
ness advice with regard to marketing; documents written by or ob-
tained from third parties; communications whose confidentiality has
been waived; and transmittal letters."
Tests To Determine The Privilege
A corporation, by its very nature an intangible and artificial entity,
cannot be harmed or helped by its "relationship" to its attorney. How-
ever, the people in the corporation can be. Most often the directors and
shareholders carry the liability for the actions of the corporation. Yet,
courts have realized the need for determining just who, in a corpora-
tion, personifies the client. The "control group" test has been adhered
to as the basis for granting attorney-client privilege to corporations.
The merits of this test were established in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,' where plaintiffs moved for default judg-
ment against a defendant who refused to answer interrogatories. Defen-
dant corporation claimed privilege with respect to information acquired
by its general counsel in the course of his investigation of facts relating
to the pending indictment of the company.
District Judge Kirkpatrick, writing for the majority, recognized
the existence of the attorney-client privilege, but said that "if the com-
munication is made to enable the lawyer to advise someone else or if it
is made by someone other than the client (the corporation) it is not
privileged.""' He realized, though, that before the privilege could be
applied, the identity of the client (the person personifying or acting on
53. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D. S.C. 1975).
54. Id. at 1161.
55. Id. at 1162.
56. Id. at 1168.
57. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
58. Id. at 484.
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behalf of the corporation) had to be ascertained:
[T]he most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the employee mak-
ing the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position
to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attor-
ney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has
that authority then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation
when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would
apply ...Of course, . . . the authority of the person speaking with
the lawyer to participate in contemplated decisions must be actual
authority [and not] apparent authority . . .5
Although hierarchial position would normally be associated with
control, it is the degree of authority which determines application of
the privilege. This narrowing of scope provided a more clearly defined
area within which to allow the protection of the privilege. Arkansas
adopted this test by statute in 1979.60
There have been significant problems with the application of the
control group test as advanced by Judge Kirkpatrick. The test tends to
ignore the complexities of a modern corporate structure and its deci-
sion-making processes. Although lower and middle-level employees fur-
nished information to the "control group," their direct communications
to the attorney were held non-privileged. Consequently, the attorney
was confronted with the possibilities of depriving lower and middle-
level employees of legal advice, developing his client's case without all
the facts, or risking disclosure of confidential information. Any alterna-
tive was potentially harmful to the corporation and its employees.
The inadequacies of the control group test were recognized in 1971
by the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.61
In this antitrust case, petitioners sought mandamus to require the dis-
trict judge to vacate his order to have defendants (petitioners) produce
certain documents to plaintiff. Apparently, the documents were secured
as the result of interviews with employees and former employees of pe-
titioner. The court found the documents were privileged, although the
employees who had given the interviews were not members of the cor-
poration's control group." The court set forth the following "subject
59. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001.502 (Repl. 1979).
61. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), affid per curiam by an equally divided court,
400 U.S. 348 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
62. The court ordered mandamus because an appeal after disclosure of the documents would




[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the em-
ployee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors...
and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the
performance by the employee of the duties of his employment."
The court pointed out, however, that this case did not deal "with the
communications of employees about matters as to which they are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from bystander witnesses, '64 thereby avoiding di-
rect opposition to the Hickman opinion.
Although the subject matter test utilized in Harper & Row signifi-
cantly promoted the policy of the attorney-client privilege, it also en-
larged the parameters of the "zone of silence" and encouraged "funnel-
ing" of miscellaneous reports and communications through the
corporate attorney. However liberal the Harper & Row subject matter
test, it did recognize the reality of the corporate structure.
Both tests were found inadequate in Duplan Corporation v. Deer-
ing Milliken, Inc., a patent antitrust suit. The court recognized that
communications between the attorney and the "control group" are priv-
ileged; but it also took "a common sense look at the practicalities of the
'control group' test."65
The chairman of the board and other top executives necessarily have
more important matters to attend to than gathering information for
either outside or inside counsel . . .Thus, the main consideration is
whether the particular representative of the client, to whom or from
whom the communication is made, is involved in rendering informa-
tion necessary to the decision-making process concerning a problem
on which legal advice is sought . . . .The extent of the privilege will
vary with the individual situation.66
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both
the control group test and the subject matter test and adopted a "modi-
fied subject matter" test. 7 The case at bar was a petition for a writ of
mandamus whereby petitioners, Diversified, sought to protect from dis-
covery the contents of a memorandum and a written report prepared by
63. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
64. Id. at 491.
65. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1164.
66. Id. at 1164-65.
67. Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
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a law firm for Diversified, and certain of Diversified's corporate min-
utes referring to the memorandum report. In granting the petition in
part and denying it in part, Judge Heaney spoke for the court en banc:
[T]he control group test inhibits the free flow of information to a legal
advisor and defeats the purpose of the attorney-client privilege ....
The Harper & Row test provides a more reasoned approach to the
problem by focusing upon why an attorney was consulted, rather than
with whom the attorney communicated . . .[but] the Harper & Row
test can shield data from the discovery process."
Again, the court anticipated unnecessary "funnelling", and so modified
the Harper & Row test to "better protect the purpose underlying the
attorney-client privilege."69
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's commu-
nication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of secur-
ing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the
request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the sub-
ject matter of the communication is within the scope of the em-
ployee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not dissemi-
nated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure,
need to know its contents. We note, moreover, that the corporation
has the burden of showing that the communication in issue meets all
of the above requirements."
In 1977, the district court of Delaware adopted a case-by-case ap-
proach in deciding Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon7 1 in an attempt to balance
the competing interests of confidentiality and liberal discovery. How-
ever, this approach plunged the privilege into a totally gray area. Ac-
cording to one commentator, this method of determining the privilege
yielded only unpredictability. "Unless a reasonable determination of
confidentiality could be made at the time of the communication then
the purpose of the privilege - to encourage communication through
the promise of confidentiality - is frustrated. '72
In In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,75 a federal district court
68. Id. at 609.
69. Id.
70. Id. It is interesting to note in this case the positions of the other judges: Judge Henley
and Chief Judge Gibson wrote separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part; Judge
Bright wrote a dissent; and Judge Webster did not consider the case.
71. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
72. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAW. 461, 496 (1982).
73. In Re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D. D.C. 1978).
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formulated a new test. Judge Charles Richey wrote for the court and
said that the attorney-client privilege should be "strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its prin-
ciple." 74 The view of the court was that the relevance of the communi-
cation should control, which narrowed even more the purposes for
which the corporate client could assert the privilege.
Upjohn Co. v. United States
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court was given an opportu-
nity to define the parameters of the still vague attorney-client privilege
and to corral the chaotic and diverse views of the courts of appeals
when presented with the case of Upjohn Co. v. United States.7 5 How-
ever, the Court sidestepped that opportunity and instead broadened the
privilege further.
The Upjohn Company is a multinational corporation that manu-
factures and sells pharmaceuticals. During an audit of Upjohn's federal
income tax returns, the IRS discovered that approximately $4.4 million
was paid to various foreign officials in order to secure their govern-
ments' business. When Gerard Thomas, Upjohn's general counsel, was
informed of the payments, he consulted outside counsel and the com-
pany's chairman of the board, who directed Thomas to conduct an in-
vestigation and give the company legal advice.
A letter, drafted by Upjohn attorneys, was sent over the chair-
man's signature to foreign managers. The letter explained the nature of
the internal investigation and instructed the managers to complete the
questionnaire attached to the letter. Their responses were to be directed
to Thomas and were to remain highly confidential.
In the course of the investigation, Upjohn attorneys conducted
eighty-six interviews, and Thomas developed memoranda, notes and
summaries of the interviews. In 1976, Upjohn filed two reports with the
SEC disclosing some of the payments, and made the reports available
to the IRS which began an investigation of its own into the tax implica-
tions of the payments. The IRS investigators were given a list of all
Upjohn employees who had been interviewed and/or answered the
questionnaire. This disclosure did not satisfy the IRS, and it filed a
summons for documents collected and initiated by Upjohn's counsel in
the course of the company's internal investigation. Upjohn refused to
produce the documents on the ground of attorney-client privilege. The
74. Id. at 384, quoting WIOMORE, supra note 9, at § 2291.
75. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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IRS petitioned for enforcement of the summons.
Judge Fox, relying on Sixth Circuit decisional precedent, used the
control group test to determine that the privilege did not apply. He
asserted that Upjohn had not carried its burden of showing that the
employees interviewed were members of the control group. The court
ordered Upjohn to produce the summoned documents, and ordered
Thomas to testify.
Upjohn appealed, and the court of appeals unanimously rejected
the subject matter test proffered by Upjohn as too broad, and adopted
the control group test. The court affirmed in pertinent part the district
court's judgment because communications by the employees were not
the corporate client's. Upjohn petitioned for and was granted a writ of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for eight members of the court, re-
cited the facts of the case and the general purpose of the privilege: "to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice. '7 6
Rehnquist explained that the Court would not select between the
proffered tests and would not set forth a broad rule. Although the
Court held that Upjohn's communications fell within the privilege,
Rehnquist, citing Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence," adopted
a case-by-case approach to the issue and limited the decision to the
facts of Upjohn.
The Court clearly pointed out that the privilege only protects dis-
closure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the under-
lying facts by those who communicated with the attorney, thus prevent-
ing "funneling." The Court agreed that the government's burden of
discovery would be less severe if it were able to obtain the results of
Upjohn's internal investigation by subpoena. (Apparently, the only
other way to get the information would be for the government to inter-
76. 449 U.S. at 389.
77. FED. R. EvID. 501 (1975):
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,




view all the people already interviewed, most of whom were in foreign
countries.) But, the Court held that considerations of convenience do
not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege. The
Court felt this expansion of the privilege "puts the adversary in no
worse position than if the communications had never taken place."78
Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, chided members of
the Court for sidestepping the opportunity to set definite guidelines for
the test of the privilege. Most commentators, however, feel Justice
Rehnquist did outline for the lower courts a test which does not contra-
vene congressional intent of the case-by-case approach. The following
factors can be inferred from the Court's analysis of Upjohn and would
prove useful in a generic setting: A communication is privileged when
(1) it is made by corporate employees to corporate counsel; (2) by or at
the direction of corporate superiors; (3) in order to secure legal advice
from counsel; (4) the communication concerns matters within the scope
of the employee's corporate duties; (5) corporate counsel needs the in-
formation to provide legal advice to the corporation concerning compli-
ance with the law; (6) the employee making the communication is suffi-
ciently aware of the purpose of his communication with counsel; (7)
both parties to the communication consider it to be confidential when
made; and (8) the information obtained is held confidential by the cor-
poration. Since the Court held the communications made by Upjohn
employees met all the above criteria, it is safe to assume that communi-
cations meeting the same criteria would be held privileged.
Upjohn, however, left many questions unanswered: Will the privi-
lege apply to a situation in which there is no express statement from
superiors or management requesting a lower-level employee to cooper-
ate with counsel? Who are "superiors" (in Justice Rehnquist's opinion)
or "management" (in Chief Justice Burger's concurrence)? May such
a request from superiors be implied or must it be expressed? What
level of confidentiality is considered "safe" before the privilege is
waived?
Arkansas Statutory Law
Practical application and guidelines of the attorney-client privilege
can be only supposed in light of Upjohn. First consideration is, of
course, given to Arkansas statutory law. Arkansas Statutes Annotated
Section 28-1001.502 sets out "Lawyer-client privilege."' 9 The statute
78. 449 U.S. at 395.
79. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001.502 (Repl. 1979):
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includes corporations in the definition of "client,"8 and says the client
(or his attorney under authority) may claim the privilege.81 Listed are
situations in which the privilege does not attach: (1) furtherance of
crime of fraud; (2) claimants through the same deceased client; (3)
breach of duty by lawyer or client; (4) document attested by lawyer;
(5) joint clients; and (6) public officer or agency.8"
502(a)(5). A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmis-
sion of the communication.
502(b). General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) be-
tween himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, (2)
between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) by him or his representative or
his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer
representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common
interest therein, (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing
the same client.
80. Rule 502. Lawyer-client privilege. - (a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organiza-
tion or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a
lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services
from him ....
81. Rule 502(c). Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or
the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other
organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the law-
yer's representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to
claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
82. Rule 502(d). Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime of fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained
to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasona-
bly should have known to be a crime or fraud;
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an
issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of
whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction;
(3) Breach of duty by a lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of
breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer;
(4) Document attested by a lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue con-
cerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness;
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest be-
tween or among two [2] or more clients if the communication was made by any of them
to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or
among any of the clients; or
(6) Public officer or agency. As to a communication between a public officer or agency
and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or
action and the court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the
public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending investigation, litiga-
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Case Law - Arkansas Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
In 1973, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal of
an attorney whom the district court held in contempt for his disobedi-
ence of an order requiring him to produce certain information before a
grand jury.8 The court cited Radiant Burners, and noted the fact that
the client is a corporation in no way affects the claim of an attorney to
his "work product" privilege. Citing numerous sources (among them
Hickman v. Taylor, and Wigmore) the court held there can be no un-
warranted inquiries into the files and mental impressions of an attor-
ney, and "[iit is clear that [the attorney's] personal recollections, notes,
and memoranda pertaining to his conversations with nonemployees of
his client are within the rubric of the work product definition."" The
court of appeals, in reversing the district court did, however, limit its
holdings to the facts of the case at bar.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in 1975, heard a suit concerning
priority of two banks as to proceeds of the sale of a debtor's property
being held in the court's registry. 65 In reversing the Cleburne County
Chancery Court, the supreme court held that information received
from third parties during the course of representation of a client did
not fall within attorney-client privilege.
In 1981, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision in Citibank, N.A. v. Andros." The principal secured
creditor of three bankrupt corporations moved to compel production of
documents. The bankruptcy court held that the trustee in bankruptcy
could not waive the attorney-client privilege. The district court af-
firmed, and the secured creditor appealed. Citing Upjohn, the court
held that "the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience" de-
termine the scope of the attorney-client privilege, 7 and "[b]ecause the
right to decide whether to waive a corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege belongs to management, the right to assert or waive that privilege
passes with the property of the corporate debtor to the trustee."88
In Sedco, International, S.A., v. Cory,89 the Eighth Circuit Court
tion, or proceeding in the public interest.
83. Duffy v. United States, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973).
84. Id. at 848.
85. Ark. Nat'l Bank v. Cleburne County Bank, 258 Ark. 329, 525 S.W. 2d 82 (1975).
86. 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1195.
88. Id.
89. 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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of Appeals heard an action against an investor brought by an oil com-
pany seeking to recover secured payments for services of an offshore
drilling rig. Affirming the trial court, the court held (1) the attorney-
client privilege does not protect facts communicated to an attorney;90
(2) clients cannot refuse to disclose facts which their attorneys con-
veyed to them and which the attorneys obtained from independent
sources; 91 (3) the privilege does not protect ordinary business advice,
although it may be difficult to distinguish, at times, from legal advice;92
and (4) a client may waive the privilege expressly or by implication.93
In 1982, a pedestrian who was hit with a rim which came off the
wheel of a passing truck brought a products liability action against the
truck owner, the service station owner and the rim manufacturer, Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Company. The circuit court awarded damages
against only the manufacturer, and the manufacturer appealed." The
pertinent facts of the case concerned the admission into evidence of a
letter written by a Firestone lawyer to other Firestone counsel. The let-
ter had attachments and a copy of one of the attachments was sent to
the author (an engineer at the Budd Company). The court held:
The letter made its way to the Budd Company and Budd surrendered
it in a lawsuit in answer to a discovery motion. Firestone argues the
letter was inadmissible under Ark. Stat. § 28-1001, Rule 502, which
provides a privilege for confidential attorney/client communications.
We deem the privilege waived. Firestone should have never allowed
the letter into the hands of Budd; by doing so Firestone has waived
any right to claim the privilege.'
Practical Application
Since the Court in Upjohn gave no explicit parameters of what
communications can be considered privileged, and Arkansas and
Eighth Circuit case law tells us only what cannot be considered privi-
leged, the safest course to follow is to assume the privilege will apply
only when all eight points used by the Supreme Court to determine
Upjohn have been met. Again, a communication appears to be privi-
leged when (1) it is made by corporate employees to corporate counsel,
(2) by or at the direction of corporate superiors, (3) in order to secure
90. Id. at 1205.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1206.
94. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little, 276 Ark. 511, 639 S.W. 2d 726 (1982).
95. Id. at 519, 639 S.W.2d at 730.
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legal advice from counsel; (4) the communication concerns matters
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; (5) corporate coun-
sel needs the information to provide legal advice to the corporation con-
cerning compliance with the law; (6) the employee making the commu-
nication is sufficiently aware of the purpose of his communication with
counsel; (7) both parties to the communication consider it to be confi-
dential when made; and (8) the information obtained is held confiden-
tial by the corporation. Generic communications within a company,
which may happen to be routed through the company's counsel, are not
privileged. Information gathered from "third parties," those persons
not acting on behalf of the company, is not privileged. Documents pre-
pared by counsel (or by management for benefit of counsel) which are
routed to "third parties" are not privileged. Application of the privilege
will be left to the discretion of the court when the content of a commu-
nication claimed to be privileged is partially business advice and par-
tially legal advice.
Matters the company considers "confidential" may indeed be so.
However, "privilege" does not attach until a matter goes to trial. In
that light, all eight precautions listed in the analysis of Upjohn must be
taken ahead of time with regard to matters which may eventually be
litigated. Companies are constantly communicating with their attorneys
with regard to SEC requirements, employee discharges, contractual ob-
ligations, and other corporate matters. These communications should
be kept confidential as a matter of course. No one who does not specifi-
cally "need to know" should receive copies of correspondence or be
orally informed about these matters. Once a "third party" sees confi-
dential material or is spoken to about a confidential matter, all poten-
tial for application of the privilege is lost.
Should the company need to conduct an internal investigation of
any nature, especially in contemplation of litigation, precautions should
be taken to prevent rejection of a claim of attorney-client privilege with
regard to communications made during the investigation. First, the
company counsel should be directed (preferably by the chairman of the
board or other superior) to make the investigation. Second, counsel
should determine who has the information sought. Third, the superior
initiating the investigation should, in writing, direct the pertinent em-
ployees to (a) cooperate fully and candidly with counsel in the investi-
gation, and (b) to treat the investigation as highly confidential. Fourth,
counsel should restrict the investigation to exclusively legal matters and
to employees who have direct responsibility to the subject matter of the
investigation. Fifth, counsel should issue a confidential report to the
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Board of Directors giving the results of its investigation. Sixth, and pos-
sibly most important, an extensive effort must be made to maintain
confidentiality of all communications with regard to the investigation.
Also, documents to which counsel may later claim privilege under the
"work product doctrine" should be located solely in the office of counsel
where access to such documents can be safeguarded. The privilege will
probably not apply if a communication on which the privilege is sought
is copied in a "reading file."
A company would be well advised to take all precautions outlined
in order to prevent discovery of confidential communications in the
event of litigation. If the above precautions are taken, the court faced
with evaluating such communications should "in the light of reason and
experience"" apply the attorney-client privilege.
96. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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